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EVIDENCE ISSUES IN INDIAN LAW CASES
Taylor S. Fielding∗
INTRODUCTION
“American archaeology has reached the point where its very
survival depends upon close interaction with the realm of law.”1 This
statement appeared in a report of a seminar in law in archaeology in 1977.
Granted, this seminar was held just a few years after the United States v.
Diaz2 case, where the Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction under the
Antiquities Act of 1906,3 and ruled the Act itself was unconstitutionally
vague. Ironically, however, it would be thirteen more years before the
anthropological world was shaken through the passage of the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA),4 which
would precipitate extensive litigation between tribes, museums, and
federal government agencies.
Jack F. Trope and Walter R. Echo-Hawk write in their historical
overview of NAGPRA that it was meant to emphasize human rights
origins, and to address one of the flagrant violations of the civil rights of
Native Americans – proper respect for the burial of their dead.5 Trope and
Echo-Hawk also write that the passage of NAGPRA was seen by many in
Congress as a logical extension of the federal government’s trust
responsibility to Native American, Hawaiian, and Alaskan Native groups.6

∗

Author received his M.S. degree in anthropology from Idaho State University in 2004
and graduated cum laude from Gonzaga University with a J.D. degree in 2008. The
author currently works for the Kalispel Tribe of Indians in Washington. The author would
like to thank former Gonzaga Law Professor and current Chief Judge of the Eastern
District of Washington, Rosanna Malouf Peterson for her assistance in the development
and editing of this article.
1
Michael Moratto, A Consideration of Law in Archeology, MANAGEMENT OF
ARCHEOLOGICAL RESOURCES: THE AIRLIE HOWE REPORT 9 (CHARLES R. MCGIMSEY III AND
HESTER A. DAVIS EDS., 1977).
2
United States v. Diaz 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
3
16 U.S.C. § 431-433.
4
Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3001 to 3013).
5
Jack F. Trope and Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act Background and Legislative History, REPATRIATION READER: W HO OWNS
AMERICAN INDIAN REMAINS? 123-168 (DEVON A. MIHESUAH ED. 2000).
6
Id.
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NAGPRA outlines a series of actions that are required if
archaeological investigations inadvertently uncover Native American
remains.7 These include: cessation of activities, notification of supervisory
personnel or the state historic preservation officer, and consultation with
“affiliated or potentially affiliated” Native American groups.8 NAGPRA also
directs museums and other federally-funded institutions9 to inventory and
attempt to determine the cultural affiliation of Native American remains,
funerary objects, and objects of cultural patrimony in their collections.10 If
cultural affiliation could be established, notification is then required of the
appropriate federally recognized tribal group that may request
repatriation.11
In the thirty years since the report on the interaction of law and
archaeology seminar, practitioners of all of the anthropology subdisciplines have served as expert witnesses in numerous cases, both civil
and criminal. Often, anthropologists are called as experts to provide the
court with information on the culture and history of Native American
groups, rather than Native American groups informing the court
themselves. This paper will examine whether anthropologists are really
more qualified to give testimony about Native American groups, while
tribal member testimony, especially about the tribe’s oral history, is
marginalized. Part I of this paper will examine some of the problems
identified with applying the Daubert factors to “soft science,” and will
examine the disparity in cases where anthropologists have testified. Part I
will also discuss whether anthropologists, specifically archaeologists, can
even provide complete expert testimony without talking to tribal members.
Part II of this paper will examine how the testimony of tribal members
regarding oral history could be admitted into court. Part III of this paper will
then turn to the issues of bias against oral history testimony.

7

25 U.S.C. § 3002.
Id., see generally THOMAS F. KING, THINKING ABOUT CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(2002); BRIAN M. FAGAN, IN THE BEGINNING (HarperCollins, 8th Ed. 1994).
9
The Smithsonian Institution and its approximately 18,500 skeletons are exempt, as its
collections are specifically covered by the National Museum of the American Indian Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-185, 103 Stat. 1336 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 80q to 80q-15); see
also Fagan, supra note 8, at 471; see generally, JACK UTTER, AMERICAN INDIANS:
ANSWERS TO TODAY’S QUESTIONS (2d ed. 2002).
10
25 U.S.C. § 3003.
11
Id. at § 3005.
8
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I. EXACTLY WHO ARE ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND WHAT DO THEY STUDY?
Anthropologists, like ice cream, come in various flavors.
Anthropology is so diverse that practitioners often specialize in one area.12
Thus, not every anthropologist will have knowledge of Native American
cultures, traditions or life ways, just as not every medical doctor would
know how to treat a heart condition. Since the major topics of study are
cultural and biological, the field is sometimes dichotomized in this
manner.13 The broad field of anthropology is traditionally broken down into
four subfields: cultural anthropologists, anthropological linguists, physical
or biological anthropologists, and archaeologists.14
Cultural anthropologists study people and their cultures.15 Cultural
anthropology is also sometimes called social anthropology,16 although
some see the term social anthropology as describing those who
specifically study social relations.17 Cultural anthropologists as a group
contain additional variation: ethnographers, who study the specific cultural
practices of a certain group of people; and ethnologists,18 who use the
data recorded by the former to make general comparisons between
cultures.19 Linguists are a division of anthropologists who study
language,20 work closely with cultural anthropologists and are considered
by some to be a subdiscipline of cultural anthropology.21
Physical or biological anthropologists study the bones and other
physical features of the human body.22 Archaeologists excavate and
examine “the material remains of extinct cultures.”23 Archaeologists’ work
is often focused on the structures and items left behind in a certain

12

E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, ANTHROPOLOGY: THE STUDY OF MAN 9 (4th ed. 1972).
Id.
14
MARVIN HARRIS, CULTURE, MAN, AND NATURE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTHROPOLOGY 1
(1971).
15
Harris, supra note 14.
16
Id.
17
Hoebel, supra note 12, at 12.
18
ROBERT B. TAYLOR, INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 16 (1973).
19
Id.
20
JOSEPH H. GREENBERG, ANTHROPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 20 (1968).
21
Hoebel, supra note 12, at 12.
22
THOMAS W. MCKERN AND SHARON MCKERN, HUMAN ORIGINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 5 (1969).
23
DAVID HURST THOMAS, PREDICTING THE PAST, AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTHROPOLOGICAL
ARCHAEOLOGY 1 (1974).
13
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geographic area.24 Archaeologists may work closely with physical
anthropologists if human remains are present.25 Unfortunately for modern
archaeologists, this subfield still carries some taint from its past, as the
first “archaeologists” were in fact “the looters and grave robbers in
antiquity.”26
A. Soft Science, Meet the Daubert Factors
Anthropologists and archaeologists are considered social scientists,
and despite the difference between these and other soft science fields
when compared to hard science fields of the natural and physical
sciences, the same evidentiary rules apply in court.
As part of the United States Supreme Court ruling that Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 replaced the Frye standard for the Federal Rules of
Evidence in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,27 the Supreme
Court outlined five criteria courts could employ in their preliminary
assessment of the reliability of scientific testimony. These factors are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

whether the theory offered had been tested;
whether it had been subjected to peer review and publication;
the known rate of error;
the existence of standards and controls; and
whether the theory is generally accepted in the scientific
community.28

The application of these factors – especially the known rate of error
criteria – work well when dealing with hard sciences such as chemistry
and physics. However, the difficulty comes in applying the Daubert factors
to non-scientific expert opinion testimony, where instead of a particular
scientific methodology, an expert’s opinion is based upon experience or
training.29 After Daubert, courts had mixed opinions as to whether the

24

Id. at 3-4.
Patricia M. Landau and D. Gentry Steele, Why Anthropologists Study Human Remains,
20 AM. INDIAN Q. 209, 212, 214 (1996).
26
Thomas, supra note 23, at 1.
27
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
28
Id. at 593
29
th
See Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10 Cir.), cert. denied, 117
th
S.Ct. 611 (1996)(collecting 10 Circuit cases where Daubert did not apply to nonscientific expert testimony.)
25
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Daubert factors were applicable to non-scientific expert opinions.30 The
Supreme Court answered the question definitively in 1999:
Daubert's general holding – setting forth the trial judge's general
“gatekeeping” obligation – applies not only to testimony based on
“scientific” knowledge, but also to testimony based on “technical”
and “other specialized” knowledge. . . . [A] trial court may consider
one or more of the more specific factors that Daubert mentioned
when doing so will help determine that testimony's reliability. But,
as the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is “flexible,” and
Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively
applies to all experts or in every case.31
Thus, as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, the Daubert
factors apply to testimony presented by soft scientists, such as
anthropologists. Some practitioners in the field of archaeology itself even
question “whether the field of archaeology can ever be pursued as a
science.”32 While some archaeological methodologies are based on
scientific principles, these methodologies may not be as objective and
scientific in practice as they are in theory.33 For example, in physical
anthropology, the use of precise measurements in craniometric analysis34
seems objective and scientific.35 In reality, however, these variables “tend
to exhibit a high degree of intra- and inter-observer error.”36 In addition,
30

th

Compare Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6 Cir. 1997) (applying Daubert factors
to non-scientific expert testimony on police discipline), and Moore v. Ashland Chemical,
th
Inc., 126 F.3d 679 (5 Cir. 1997)(holding Daubert factors not applicable to testimony by
clinical physician, differentiating clinical medicine from laboratory or research medicine).
31
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999).
32
Allison M. Dussias, Kennewick Man, Kinship and the “Dying Race”: The Ninth Circuit’s
Assimilationist Assault on the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,
84 NEB. L. REV. 55, 116 (2005) (quoting J.M. ADOVASIO AND JAKE PAGE, THE FIRST
AMERICANS: IN PURSUIT OF ARCHAEOLOGY’S GREAT MYSTERY 15 (2002)).
33
See also Ashley Young, Continuing an American Legacy of Racial and Cultural
Injustice: A Critical Look at Bonnichsen v. United States, 17 DEPAUL LCA J. ART & ENT. L.
1, 34 (2006) (discussing the fact the methods and theories of crainology were once
believed to be objective and neutral).
34
Craniometrics is the science of studying the size and shape of the skull. See Eleanor
M. Miller and Carrie Yang Costello, The Limits of Biological Determinism, 66 AM. SOC.
REV. 592, 592 (2001).
35
Dussias, supra note 32, at 116.
36
Id. (quoting the Osteological Assessment Report on the Kennewick Man remains
completed by Joseph F. Powell and Jerome C. Rose). See also Nicholas Wade, A New
Look at Old Data May Discredit a Theory on Race, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 8,
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these measurements can be perverted into supporting incorrect
conclusions, as they do in craniology.37 Moreover, the use of the
geological method of stratigraphy suffers from the same variability. For
instance, the number of stratigraphic layers that can be identified in the
side-wall of an excavation unit38 can depend on who is viewing the sidewall as well as lighting and soil conditions. The technique of radiocarbon
(C14) dating, developed in the late 1940s, fulfills the Daubert factors of a
well-tested theory that has been peer reviewed and accepted by the
scientific community.39 However, even this relatively scientific method
does not always hold up to the Daubert factor of replication to receive the
same result, as other hard science tests would. As an example, evidence
of this is present in the Bonnichsen case, where the results of radiocarbon
dating on bone samples varied greatly between the 1996 and 1999 tests.40
Thus, the objectiveness and scientific characteristics of
anthropology clearly fall to the softer side of the spectrum, even for more
scientific methodologies such as radiocarbon dating. Anthropology is not
alone in this plight, as historians and linguists are similarly situated. How
effectively the Daubert factors apply to soft science fields, such as history
and linguistics, and how successfully the methodologies used in those soft
science fields would hold up against the Daubert inquiry is open to debate.
2002)http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/08/science/a-new-look-at-old-data-may-discredita-theory-on-race.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
37
During the Nineteenth Century, a pseudoscience called craniology, although
sometimes incorrectly referred to also as craniometry, developed based on numerous
studies completed using craniometric methods that showed different skull capacities
between ethnic groups and genders, leading to conclusions that skull capacity was a way
to measure intelligence. See Miller and Costello supra note 34; Catherine E. Martin,
Educating to Combat Racism: The Civic Role of Anthropology, 27 ANTHROPOLOGY &
EDUC. Q. 252, 255 (1996).
38
The identification of stratigraphic layers in an archaeological excavation is based on
the geological law of superposition, which in archaeology, is interpreted as a distinct layer
of soil or refuse occurring above another layer is presumed to have been deposited later
in time than the underlying layer. This technique allows for an archaeologist to create a
rough chronology of occupation for the site based on the layers. This technique can be
inaccurate if the layers are mixed by natural or human processes. See generally John
Howland Rowe, Stratigraphy and Seriation, 26 AM. ANTIQUITY 324 (1961); Edward C.
Harris, The Laws of Archaeological Stratigraphy, 11 W ORLD ARCHAEOLOGY 111 (1979).
39
See R.E. Taylor, The Contribution of Radiocarbon Dating to New World Archaeology,
42 RADIOCARBON 1, 3-4 (2000).
40
Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1128, (noting the great variability in
the results may have been due to any number of factors) see also, Thomas supra, note
23 (radiocarbon dates ranged from 8410 +/- 40 years before present to 5570 +/- 100
years before present; with several sample results falling in between).
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Courts experience difficulty in applying the Daubert standards to
historical scholarship, according to one author.41 In her analysis,
Schneider found that the testability factor is difficult to apply without an
objective historian.42 Specifically, the publication and peer review factor is
not necessarily helpful in weeding out “junk history.”43 Additionally, the
potential rate of error, the third Daubert factor, is “completely inapplicable
as a standard for evaluating historical scholarship.”44 The existence of
standards is also difficult to apply due to a lack of a “widely recognized
code of conduct.”45 Lastly, general acceptance could be deceiving, since
general acceptance may be roughly gauged by scholarly works, yet they
are a poor test for methodological reliability.46
Alternatively, linguistics “should fare quite well” in response to a
Daubert inquiry, at least according to two legal scholars.47 Scholars cite
the fact that “[l]inguistics is a robust field that relies heavily on peerreviewed journals for dissemination of work.”48 While acknowledging that
multiple theories may exist in the field of linguistics, Tiersma and Solan
assert the facts would be immutable:
“while there may be disagreement as to why we understand a given
linguistic structure to have a particular range of meanings, the fact
of the range of meanings should not normally be controversial.”49
Alternatively, the presence and even the use of multiple theories in
data analysis have been advocated in some fields as an inquiry into “how
findings are affected by different assumptions and fundamental
premises.”50 The issue of multiple theories in a field of study is also
present in anthropology, and cannot be easily dismissed. Anthropologist
Kerry D. Feldman asks the question, “to what extent are we, or can we be,

41

Wendie Ellen Schneider, Past Imperfect, 110 YALE L. J. 1531 (2001).
Id. at 1538.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Peter Tiersma and Lawrence M. Solan, The Linguist on the Witness Stand: Forensic
Linguistics in American Courts, 78 Language 221, 225 (2002).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 226 (emphasis in original).
50
Michael Q. Patton, Enhancing the Quality and Credibility of Qualitative Analysis, 34
HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH, 1189, 1196 (1999).
42
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competent expositors of all of them?”51 Feldman, who was an expert
witness in litigation involving an Alaskan Native Village corporation, noted
“both sides found scientific data to support their claims” which he feels
“forces the anthropologist to examine even more closely the nature of
‘facts’ in relation to personally held ‘theories’ which purport to explain
those facts.”52
Feldman further describes “a fundamental incongruence” between
the research methods of social science and legal evidence rules.53
Specifically, the ethnographies produced by anthropologists are entirely
based on oral narratives that would be deemed hearsay in court.54
However, another scholar, Lawrence Rosen, advocates that
anthropologists acting as expert witnesses may actually be able to glean
something from their experience.55 Rosen writes that participation in the
Indian Claims Commission (ICC) hearings may have resulted in scholars’
altering their classification systems in their studies to more closely parallel
the categories being used by the ICC.56
Additionally, Rosen cites an overhaul of anthropological
methodologies.57 The conclusion to Rosen is obvious, “it is clear that
participation in legal cases has had a reciprocal effect on anthropological
thinking.”58 Even if Rosen is correct, and some members of that
generation of anthropologists did alter their practices based on the ICC
experiences, it is doubtful that this change would make anthropology more
robust if tested against the Daubert factors.
Even if anthropologists altered their methodologies based on legal
experiences, it does not change the fact that the Daubert factors were
originally developed for a hard science field, that of medicine and
pharmaceuticals. Thus, many of the Daubert factors are easily applied to
laboratory research where most if not all variables can be controlled, and
51

Kerry D. Feldman, Ethnohistory and the Anthropologist as Expert Witness in Legal
Disputes: A Southwestern Alaska Case, 36 J. OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 245, 246
(1980).
52
Id. at 248.
53
Id. at 246.
54
Id.
55
Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropologist as Expert Witness, 79 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 555
(1977).
56
Id. at 567.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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an experiment repeated to achieve the same result. While each of the
subfields of anthropology has established methods and procedures
designed to eliminate error, it remains that anthropological research has a
subjective quality that cannot be eliminated. In addition, it is clear that
some anthropological methodologies, such as the gathering of oral
narratives and histories to compose ethnographies, did not change. As
Feldman points out, this methodology is part of the problem, since the
source material is deemed unreliable by courts.59
B. Anthropologists Take the Stand as Expert Witnesses
This paper will focus on cases where anthropologists have testified
as expert witnesses. In order to sufficiently narrow the topic of discussion,
the cases examined involved Native American groups and can be easily
divided into two categories: treaty right cases and cultural resources
cases.
1. Treaty Rights Cases
The cases classified here as treaty rights cases arose in United
States district courts and were both state challenges to the validity and
possible state regulation of Native Americans’ off-reservation fishing
rights.
The first case, United States v. Washington,60 adjudicated the
validity of off-reservation treaty rights in rivers and off-shore waters of
Western Washington Native American groups. Due to the trust
relationship between Native Americans and the federal government, the
suit was brought by the United States against the State of Washington.
The Washington case also addressed the issue of state regulation of
Native Americans’ off-reservation fishing activities, with the court holding
that the power of general regulation was with the tribes and not within the
state’s police powers. However, the court did allow for the State to impose
some regulations on off-reservation Native American fishing, but only
where the State did not discriminate against Native American fishermen,
and where the State could show the restrictions were “reasonable and
necessary to conservation.”61

59

Feldman, supra note 51, at 246.
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash., 1974).
61
Id. at 342.
60
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The beginning of the section of the Washington opinion discussed
the pre-treaty role of fishing in the lives of northwest Native Americans,
and focused on a classic situation seen in civil cases: dueling experts. The
anthropologists presented reports on “Indian life in the case area at and
prior to the time of the treaties, including the treaty councils, Indian groups
covered by the treaties, the purposes of the treaties and the Indians'
understanding of treaty provisions.”62 The court found the testimony and
reports of the plaintiffs’ anthropologist more credible. Specifically, the court
said, “nothing in [the anthropologist appearing for the plaintiffs’] report and
testimony was controverted by any credible evidence in the case.”63 The
use of oral histories is not even mentioned in the opinion until the next to
last finding of fact in that section, three pages later in the reporter. The use
of oral histories appears to have been limited to the identification of
traditional fishing areas used by the Native American plaintiffs in the case.
The second case, United States v. Michigan,64 also involved a
challenge by tribes to the regulation of their off-reservation fishing
activities by the state. The opinion specifically names three plaintiff
witnesses: an ethnohistorian,65 and two anthropologists. The Michigan
court dedicated a paragraph to each of these witnesses, describing their
qualification as an expert, and in one case, criticizing the defense’s
attempt to impeach the plaintiffs’ anthropologist. While testimony
regarding oral histories of the tribes involved was heard, the court fails to
mention any of these witnesses by name. In fact, the court gives only two
lines in the opinion to recognize the Native American witnesses who
appeared for the plaintiff United States and tribes: “The oral testimony of
the tribal witnesses educated in the history and customs of their people by
tribal elders is found to be reasonable and credible factual data regarding
certain relevant aspects of Indian life at and after treaty times.”66

62

Id. at 350.
Id. at 350.
64
United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Mich., 1979).
65
An ethnohistorian is a practitioner of the ethnohistorical method, where the history of a
specific group or culture is developed through the use of “ethnography, linguistics,
archaeology and ecology.” See American Society for Ethnohistory, About the ASE,
http://www.ethnohistory.org/sections/about_ase/index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
66
United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. at 219.
63
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2. Cultural Resource Cases
Ironically, both of the cultural resource cases examined arose in the
Ninth Circuit, the same circuit that found the Antiquities Act67
unconstitutionally vague in United States v. Diaz,68 Both Bonnichsen v.
United States and Fallon-Paiute Shoshone Tribe v. United States also
involved the extremely old (8,300 to nearly 10,000 years old) remains of
an individual male.
In Bonnichsen v. United States,69 the Ninth Circuit was hearing a
challenge by tribes to a district court ruling that the remains of an
individual, who died possibly as long as 9,200 years ago, were subject to
the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (ARPA),70 not (NAGPRA).
The lower court rejected the government’s determination that the
individual was a Native American, and thus held that NAGPRA was
inapplicable.71
In the lower court, the magistrate judge held that “reliance upon oral
narratives under the circumstances presented here is highly problematic.”
Even though the narratives were presented by an anthropologist, the
lower court still found this evidence to be unreliable. The district court’s
ruling demonstrates that even when oral narrative evidence is presented
by an anthropologist, who would have been qualified as an expert under
the Daubert standard, acceptance of the evidence by the court is not a
foregone conclusion. It must be concluded that the court, despite the
involvement of an anthropologist, finds the underlying material from which
the anthropologist draws his conclusions, the oral narratives themselves,
to be defectively unreliable. The court instead used archaeological and
radiocarbon dating evidence to find there were sufficient gaps in the
chronological record, which the court concluded showed a lack of cultural
affiliation between the remains and the tribal claimants.
The second case, Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. United States,72
is factually similar to the Bonnichsen case, also involving the remains of
an individual of similar age and described as “an extremely ancient
67

16 U.S.C. § 431-433.
United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
69
Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004).
70
Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (1979) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470aa to 470mm).
71
Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Or., 2002).
72
Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Nev., 2006).
68
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habitant of Northern Nevada.”73 However, the United States District Court
noted neither the tribe, nor the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), had
raised the issue of whether the individual was a Native American.
Therefore, the Bonnichsen cases, and the determination that ARPA rather
than NAGPRA was applicable to a skeleton of this antiquity, were not
controlling.74 The Tribe argued that the BLM did not take into account
scientific evidence it presented,75 while the BLM argued it could rely on its
own experts.76 The Tribe retained its own experts and provided the BLM
with the evidence it had gathered, at which point the Tribe claims it was
shut out of the process for determining the affiliation of the remains.77 The
Tribe provided additional evidence when the issue was presented to the
NAGPRA Review Committee, which issued a non-binding advisory
opinion stating that the tribe was affiliated with the remains.78 The court
acknowledged the BLM’s right to believe its expert, but noted that position
“does not leave the BLM free to ignore other competing views by failing to
recognize their existence and refusing to describe the reasons why they
were not accepted.”79 This case was remanded to the BLM by the court
after it found the determination the remains were culturally unaffiliated to
be arbitrary and capricious. In remanding the case, the court instructed,
“BLM is reminded that it must present cogent reasons for its findings, even
when it is essentially choosing between two competing theories.”80
C. Consideration of Oral History as an Interpretive Guidepost
Whether archaeologists should look to Native American oral
traditions themselves is debated. Some archaeologists advocate using
oral histories as a resource for interpreting archaeological findings,
possibly giving the archaeological findings context.81 Others dismiss oral
histories as not testable as an archaeological hypothesis,82 but
“[n]evertheless, foolish or angelic archaeologists will continue to pick and
73

Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1216.
75
Id. at 1219-1220, 1223.
76
Id. at 1224.
77
Id. at 1219.
78
Id. at 1223.
79
Id. at 1224.
80
Id. at 1225.
81
Peter M. Whiteley, Archaeology and Oral Tradition: The Scientific Importance of
Dialogue, 67 AM. ANTIQUITY 405 (2002).
82
Id. See also Ronald Mason, Archaeology and Native North American Oral Traditions,
65 AM. ANTIQUITY 239 (2000).
74
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choose among the offerings of oral traditions.”83 Those archaeologists who
question the value of oral histories and traditions and advocate not relying
on them, are often the greatest proponents of archaeology as a scientific
endeavor. These proponents argue that “[t]o preserve, let alone extend,
the unparalleled power of science and systematic historiography to
produce testable historical statements requires, like liberty, eternal
vigilance.”84 The view of this position is that archaeologists are objective,
truth-seeking scientists.85
This position is contrasted by those who believe Native American
oral histories and traditions not only have value, but can in fact be
tested.86 For example, the examination of the remains of massacre victims
by a physical anthropologist contradicted the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saint’s historic accounts of the event, and were more
consistent with the accounts obtained through interviews of various
parties, including Native Americans, done by United States Army officers
within a couple of years of the event.87 In addition, Whiteley points to the
presence of specific place names and locations in Hopi migration legends
which could theoretically be tested archaeologically.88 Archaeologists
holding this latter view often point to the classical archaeology where
archaeological discoveries are compared to ancient Greek and Roman
records,89 noting that field of study is “hardly lacking analytical vigor.”90
The difference between the acceptance of Greek and Roman written
records in classical archaeology versus the rejection of oral histories and
traditions in prehistoric archaeology comes down to the method of
recordation.91 Yet, many anthropologists who are willing to accept oral
history and tradition as valid evidence believe it may be more accurate
than written accounts of the same event.92 Of course, there exists the real
possibility that no matter which source is being tested, Native American
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oral history or written records of the dominant culture, the resulting data
uncovered by scientists and their conclusions may disprove the very fact
being investigated.93
It appears the one point archaeologists can agree on is that there is
a schism in the field, based on an idea there are, at least, two ways to
view and interpret the past,94 either through the examination of
archaeological artifacts or through the learning of Native American oral
narratives and histories, with the heart of the disagreement being the
amount of weight and credibility to be given to which and whose
interpretation.95
II. NATIVE AMERICANS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES
The use of Native American tribal members in presenting
testimonial evidence of their oral traditions may be accomplished in one of
two ways: qualifying the tribal member as an expert witness or via a
hearsay exception.
A. An Elder as an Expert
A Native American can serve as an expert witness as to the tribe’s
traditions, understanding and history, as shown in Cree v. Sandberg.96
This case was an appeal by the State of Washington of a district court
ruling that the Yakama Tribe’s treaty exempted the tribe from paying
Washington’s truck license and permit fees. The Ninth Circuit upheld the
exemption, noting the district court’s reliance on a tribal member’s
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testimony as to the tribe’s understanding of the treaty language was not
an abuse of discretion.97
Qualifying a tribal member to be an expert witness is not outside
the realm of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 allows for a witness
to be qualified as an expert not only through scientific credentials, but also
if the witness has specialized knowledge or experience.98 In examining
Rule 702, authors have commented, “[t]here are no definite guidelines for
determining the knowledge, skill or experience required either in a
particular case or of a particular witness.”99 In Native American culture, it
is often that only certain members of the tribe may know the “particulars of
the territory, its mythological construction, and cultural uses.”100 In hearing
evidence on matters related to Native Americans, courts should consider
that certain tribal members, including elders, testifying as to their own oral
traditions and history would be experts as they would have access to
knowledge that may not generally be known. Being able to include this
knowledge in the evidentiary records clearly would be helpful to the trier of
fact, which is the touchstone for the admissibility of expert testimony.101
Not all are so willing to find the testimony of tribal members,
especially elders, as helpful in the search for truth. Mason, an
anthropology professor, claims such testimony is biased because it
“credits ‘elders’ with powers of memory credibility far beyond anything that
would be granted anyone else.”102 Mason further attacks those identified
as tribal elders as having “a credential with known power to disarm
otherwise worldly scholars. . . a potential trap as likely constructed by the
information seeker as by its giver.”103
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Expert testimony given by tribal members or elders faces the
difficulty of meeting the Daubert factors described above.104 Clearly, the
testimony being given by tribal elders is non-scientific in nature, versus
testimony given by soft science anthropologists. How this would alter the
application of Daubert is unclear. While the Supreme Court in Kumho tells
the courts to apply the Daubert factors, the Kumho case, and some
commentators, leaves open the possibility that “a court may have to
consider factors other than those listed in Daubert.”105 Since the list of
Daubert factors is “neither dispositive nor exhaustive,”106 some of the
alternative factors that may be considered include “unjustified
extrapolation … to an unfounded conclusion,”107 accounting for alternative
explanations, and “whether the field of expertise … is known to reach
reliable results.”108
The basis for an expert’s opinion testimony is governed by Federal
Rule of Evidence 703. This rule sets forth three bases for expert
testimony: personal knowledge, facts already in the record, and facts not
in the record.109 The facts in the third category must be “of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
and inferences upon the subject.”110 The third category is noted to be
controversial since the expert can base an opinion on facts not in the
record, and could base that opinion on “facts [that] may be inadmissible
hearsay.”111 Courts have defended the policy allowing this external basis
for an expert opinion since the court believes “the expert is fully capable of
judging for himself what is, or is not, a reliable basis for his opinion.”112
A tribal member’s expert opinion testimony about the tribe’s oral
traditions and history would fall under this third basis. While the testimony
about oral histories cannot be expected to “conform exactly to scientific
models of falsifiability,”113 in other words, they cannot be subjected to a
mechanical formula to prove their truth, there are cultural “canons for
104
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evaluating truth-claims and appraising the plausibility of particular
accounts of the past.”114 Whiteley gives the example of two stories, each
about the migration of a particular Hopi clan to their present day location.
These stories “are entrenched features of a corpus of Hopi narratives,”
thus an individual who tells the stories incorrectly “would be dismissed as
a know-nothing….”115 This process, which Whiteley describes as
subjecting the account to “critical standards of historical judgment,”116 is
the same process described by the United States v. Sims117 court as the
expert’s own evaluation of a reliable basis.
B. Making Use of Hearsay Exceptions
The other option for admitting testimony about Native American oral
traditions in court is to use an existing hearsay exception that allows the
admission of hearsay testimony to prove “reputation concerning
boundaries or general history.”118 The text of the hearsay exception allows
testimony going to the “[r]eputation in a community, arising before the
controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the
community, and reputation as to events of general history important to the
community . . .”119
In order to better understand the exception, the notes of the
advisory committee prove somewhat helpful. These notes show that this
hearsay exception “is based upon the general admissibility of evidence of
reputation as to land boundaries and land customs, expanded in this
country to include private as well as public boundaries.”120 There is sparse
modern case law on this hearsay exception.
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In Rickert v. Thompson,121 the court held hearsay evidence was
admissible to prove ancient boundaries. However, the advisory committee
notes appear to restrict the applicability of the exception: “the reputation is
required to antedate the controversy, though not to be ancient.”122 Thus,
testimony by a tribal member may not be admissible for the controversies
found in the Bonnichsen and Fallon Paiute-Shoshone cases, which
involve human remains that are several millennia old. However, the term
“ancient” is not defined in either the Federal Rules of Evidence or in the
advisory committee notes. Therefore, testimony from tribal members
about the tribe’s more recent oral history and traditions is still beneficial in
establishing a presence in the area where remains are found so the tribe
will be consulted upon the discovery of the remains123 and possibly to
establish cultural affiliation with the remains.124 This is also important since
past relocation or removal of tribes by the federal government may have
resulted in a tribe being far removed from their aboriginal territory.125 In
addition, prior to European contact, many tribes were highly mobile
hunter-gathers, who moved across large territories to exploit available
resources.126 This exception would have more applicability in cases where
the subject of the controversy is not several millennia old, such as the
treaty rights cases discussed above.
Another example where testimony regarding oral history was
important evidence is the Indian Claims Commission127 cases, although
even in those cases, such testimony was sometimes given little or no
121
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credit.128 In Wally v. United States,129 the court allowed testimony as to
reputation about facts which were no longer available to individuals or
other proof to show the location of ancient boundaries. An argument can
therefore be made that the oral histories of tribes would qualify as
testimony to prove the reputation of facts about past events that are
known by the community as a whole, but are no longer available to
individuals. Testimony about oral histories could provide information not
only about the boundaries of aboriginal lands, but also regarding tribal
activities such as hunting, fishing and gathering methods,130 and locations
where those activities took place.131
Ironically, the exceptions to the hearsay rule reflect the preference,
or perhaps bias, for written records, generally based upon the assumption
that written records are a more correct and accurate reflection of an event
than an oral statement, or as here, oral history. For example, exceptions
to the hearsay rule exist for the records of religious organizations,132
marriage and baptism certificates,133 and personal family histories
contained in family Bibles.134 However, this is not surprising, since “[t]he
law implicitly embodies the religious premises of the dominant culture.”135
Therefore, since the nature of many Native American traditions, practices,
and religious activities are foreign to the courts, it is not surprising that
evidence rules which seem to favor records of Christian and other
Western religions have a preferred position. This reality is described well
by Whiteley: “the Bible’s very textuality enables it to be conceptualized as
including history more easily than is the case with oral mythology, owning
to the engrained – though largely unexamined – ideas about the supposed
instability and unreliability of oral narratives in the Western cult of the
written word.”136 In addition, other hearsay exceptions reflect this
preference, in this case for history and science, in the existing exceptions
for statements in ancient documents137 and learned treatises.138
128

See Pueblo de Zia v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 371 (1960) (discussed below).
Wally v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 371 (1960).
130
See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 352.
131
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §18.04[2][e] (2005).
132
Fed. R. Evid. 803(11).
133
Fed. R. Evid. 803(12).
134
Fed. R. Evid. 803(13).
135
Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in
Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1291, 1301 (1996).
136
Whiteley, supra note 81, at 407.
137
Fed. R. Evid. 803(16).
138
Fed. R. Evid. 803(18).
129

303

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL

Volume I, Issue II – Spring 2013

III. BIAS AGAINST NATIVE AMERICAN ORAL HISTORY AND TRADITION
Judges wield great power in acting as gatekeepers on the
admissibility of evidence and testimony, however, in being human, are
influenced by their paradigm or worldview. Worse yet, the decisions of
some judges reflect, directly or indirectly, discrimination and bias. Some
jurists have written, “[t]he testimony of Native Americans in court provides
compelling evidence of cultural practices.”139 However, the testimony of
tribal members, especially regarding oral traditions and history, is not
always met with the considerable respect as was the case in Cree v.
Sandberg.140 There, the trial court considered Mr. William Yallup, a fullblooded Yakama Indian, as the “ultimate expert” on the tribe’s
interpretation of their treaty.141 Contrast that situation with the one in
Pueblo de Zia v. United States,142 where the Indian Claims Commission
“virtually ignored” oral accounts of history passed from father to son,
despite the fact some of this oral history was corroborated by other
documentary evidence.143 The Commissions’ reasoning: “all of these
witnesses were young men (ages 47 to 59) who, in point of time, are far
removed from the issue in question . . . .”144 The Court of Claims reversed
and remanded, chastising the Commission for its treatment of the oral
history testimony: “[s]uch evidence is entitled to some weight; it cannot be
ignored or discarded as ‘literally worthless.’”145 Interestingly, the
Commission also disregarded the historical and archaeological evidence
that was offered in support of the oral history testimony in finding no claim.
The Court of Claims disagreed, finding the “specific documentary
corroborations and the general dovetailing . . . of [the] historical and
archaeological evidence and [the] testimony”146 fulfilled the plaintiff tribes’
burden of proof in establishing aboriginal title to a tract of land outside the
land granted to them by the federal government.
One series of cases that has been roundly criticized for appearing
biased against Native American oral tradition and history is the
Bonnichsen line of cases. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in the case has
139
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been called by one commentator “the most lethal attack on Native
American identity in recent American jurisprudence,”147 due to the district
and appellate courts’ disregard of the oral history evidence. Much of the
criticism of the decision is centered on Ninth Circuit’s focus on science in
the case.148 The Ninth Circuit was critical of the Secretary of Interior’s use
of oral history evidence, and noted the presence of gaps in the empirical
record that precluded the Secretary’s finding of cultural affiliation between
Kennewick Man and modern tribes. The court made this ruling despite the
fact the regulations implementing NAGPRA specifically note that a finding
of cultural affiliation is based on an “evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances.”149 Thus, the Secretary’s use of the oral history evidence
was valid under the regulations. Those same regulations dictate that a
finding of cultural affiliation “should not be precluded solely because of
some gaps in the record.”150 It appears from the Ninth Circuit’s holding
that there is a point at which there are too many gaps in the record,
however, the court fails to offer either a bright line rule or test that would
produce consistent results in future situations or litigation. Without further
discussion or clarification by the courts, the basic lesson drawn from the
Bonnichsen line of cases is that science will tip the scales. Other
commentators have reached the same conclusion.
Ashley Young wrote, “the court’s analysis clearly reinforced the
long-standing norm of the dominant society that science trumps
culture.”151 Allison Dussias concurs with this view, noting the Native
American’s “understandings of kinship, ancestry, and history were treated
as uncivilized and unscientific, and therefore not entitled to respect from
the dominant society and its judicial system.”152 The issue of courts
accepting science over other forms of evidence is a problem that
apparently Congress anticipated. While prescribing a preponderance of
the evidence standard, the regulations also state, “[c]laimants do not have
to establish cultural affiliation with scientific certainty.”153
Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of tribal oral histories in favor of
more scientific evidence appears to conflict with Congress’ understanding
147
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of the circumstances faced by tribes.154 S. Alan Ray writes that the
problem was the court’s lack of a “conceptual scheme . . . to understand
and take seriously the testimony of present-day members of tribal
claimants.”155 Thus, because the oral histories failed to provide facts
similar to modern historical studies, they were dismissed as
unpersuasive.156 Commentators find this action to be contrary to
Congress’s intent for NAGPRA, and that rather than discounting oral
history testimony, Congress in fact viewed it as one of the “relevant types
of evidence to be considered without indicating that it was to be given
lesser weight than other forms of evidence.”157 In affirming the district
court ruling, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bonnichsen is seen as contrary
to the prior acceptance of oral tradition and history in United States
courts.158 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Bonnichsen, of course, was
welcomed by the plaintiff scientists who felt the Army Corps of Engineers
and Secretary of the Interior were “anti-science,”159 and others who object
to the incorporative endorsement of minority religions that reject science
and scholarship into federal law.160
CONCLUSION
The issue of allowing testimony on Native American oral history
and traditions in the courts is not easily resolved. The same issue has
caused a schism among archaeologists themselves. This type of evidence
has been treated differently depending upon the facts of the case and the
court hearing it. It is difficult to tell whether this is based on genuine
154
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concerns by some courts over the reliability of the testimony, is the result
of incompatibility based on the differences between the law and the
evidence’s underlying cultural origins, or is simply the work of biased
jurists.
One thing is certain: the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bonnichsen
muddied the already murky waters of the ambiguous language of
NAGPRA. The clash between science and oral history was highlighted by
this very public dispute. It resulted in calls for amendments to clarify the
wording of several provisions in NAGPRA. And the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Bonnichsen has done little to put a definitive end to the debate: the
decision has already been deemed not controlling in the Fallon PaiuteShoshone Tribe case being heard in the U.S. District Court in Nevada.
While the Indian Claims Commission is no longer, and the treaty
rights cases referenced here were heard 30 years ago, there are certain to
be additional non-cultural resource cases that will be heard by the federal
courts, some which may involve the introduction of testimony on Native
American oral tradition. It is clear that an argument can be made for
allowing tribal elders themselves to testify, either using a hearsay
exception, or by qualifying the tribal elder as an expert witness. Attorneys
for tribes will need to be prepared to use one or both strategies to have
oral history testimony allowed into litigation, especially if it is critical to the
tribes’ arguments, as reflected in the treaty rights and cultural resources
cases touched on here.
The Ninth Circuit in Bonnichsen showed that even oral history
presented by an anthropologist was not necessarily more influential
evidence than having it straight from the elders’ mouths. While the facts of
Bonnichsen may have not been the best for a strong argument in support
of oral traditions because of the age of the remains involved, the district
court in the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe case was not as quick to
dismiss the oral history evidence.
Considering the resurgence of tribes exercising their sovereign
powers and with the support of the federal government’s position on tribes
defining their own self identity, tribes are putting money, often gaming
revenues, into programs preserving their culture, history and language.
While some of this preservation may involve the writing down of narratives
or interviews with tribal elders, it is likely traditional methods of passing
information, through learning and listening of these narratives and
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knowledge from elders, will continue. With tribes’ increasing wealth due to
gaming revenues, and their efforts to further broaden their economies,
there will undoubtedly be more interaction between tribes and nonIndians, some of which may result in litigation in the federal courts. A tribal
attorney will have to be ready to muster the arguments if oral history
testimony is needed, and will have to have some luck that the judge
hearing the case was more like those in Cree v. Sandberg than those in
Bonnichsen.
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